







	From	the	“thunderous	denunciations”	of	mass	culture	by	the	Frankfurt	School	to	the	ambivalence	of	Habermas	towards	mass	media,	 it	has	been	argued	that	we	have	moved	 from	culture-debating	 to	culture-consuming	 publics	 (Peters,	 1993).	 We	 have	 abandoned	 the	 coffee	 house	 in	 favour	 of	grumpy	cats	and	lulz.	Furthermore,	our	societal	damnation	has	only	been	reaffirmed	and	deepened	by	a	move	towards	a	form	of	cognitive	capitalism.	Berardi	(2011)	and	Marazzi	(1994),	in	their	re-spective	work	on	the	politics	of	the	language	economy,	have	suggested	that	cognitive	capitalism	has	given	life	to	a	new	form	of	crisis;	the	crisis	of	capital	today	is	not	merely	economic,	it	also	a	crisis	of	the	social	imagination,	and	language	and	discourse	is	political.	It	can	be	enclosed	by	capital.	Howev-er,	to	stop	our	analysis	there	is	not	only	pessimistic	but	also	fails	to	see	the	emancipatory	potential	within	language	and	our	media	systems.	Although	language	and	discourse	can	be	enclosed	by	capi-tal,	I	would	argue	it	can	never	fully	be	co-opted.	While	media,	especially	the	online	sphere,	are	full	of	obfuscating	pomp	and	trolling	harangues,	there	remains	a	potential	critical	spark	in	the	culture	and	poetry	of	everyday	language.	Echoing	Stuart	Hall,	it	is	the	extent	to	which	popular	culture	and	technology	are	sites	of	contestation	and	 the	degree	 to	which	 they	can	be	mobilized	 to	destabilize	systems	of	domination	that	they	matter:	“Otherwise,	to	tell	you	the	truth,	I	don’t	give	a	damn	about	it”	(Hall,	1998).	This	paper	will	investigate	the	critical	spark	that	language	and	popular	culture	can	offer	in	an	era	of	cognitive-capitalism—and	who	knows,	maybe	we’ll	have	a	few	lulz	along	the	way.		
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“the	incorporation	of	techno-linguistic	automatisms	produced	by	semio-capital	has	produced	a	form	that	is	not	an	external	domination	that	acts	on	the	body,	but	a	mutation	of	the	social	organism	itself”	(p.	9).		Human	activity,	 especially	 collective	 semiotic	 activity,	 has	become	 transcodified	by	 the	 economy:	“the	word	is	no	longer	a	factor	in	the	conjunction	of	talking	effective	bodies”	(Marazzi,	1994/2011,	p.	19).	In	essence,	Post-Fordism	is	defined	by	a	semio-capitalism	that	has	effectively	frozen	the	af-fective	potency	of	language.		An	 examination	 of	 language	within	 a	 capitalistic	 system	must	 recognize	 its	 ideological	 nature	lest	our	pursuit	of	the	emancipatory	spark	of	 language	be	 lost	 in	a	Habermasian	voluntarism	(the	doctrine	that	the	will	is	a	fundamental	or	dominant	factor	in	the	individual	or	the	universe)	and	po-litical	naiveté.	Berardi	(2012)	has	suggested	that	our	society	is	undergoing	a	deep	crisis,	but	that	it	is	“much	more	a	crisis	of	social	imagination	than	mere	economics”	(p.	7).	Our	struggle	today	is	situ-ated	within	language	(Marazzi,	1994/2011).		Berardi	(2012),	 in	The	Uprising:	On	Poetry	and	Finance,	wrote	that	poetry,	as	 language’s	excess,	could	not	be	reduced	to	information.	It	is	to	poetry	then	that	he	believed	we	must	turn	as	it	allows	for	—	“a	new	common	ground	of	understanding	and	shared	meaning:	the	creation	of	a	new	world”	(Berardi,	2012,	p.	147).	While	language	is	infinite,	it	operates	within	finite	conditions	of	history	and	existence—poetry,	for	Berardi,	is	the	reopening	of	the	indefinite.	Like	Guattari’s	(1992)	concept	of	“chaosmosis”	(the	process	of	going	beyond	the	limit	world),	there	is	an	ability	to	go	beyond	the	se-miotic	 limit—a	 redefinition	 of	 language	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 move	 towards	 an	 experimental	 world.	While	digital	capitalism	has	created	a	closed	 linguistic	world,	acts	of	poetic	 language	can	“give	us	the	ability	to	create	a	new	human	condition”	(Berardi,	2012,	pp.	156-157).		There	 is	an	appeal	 to	 the	 idea	of	poiesis	as	a	way	by	which	we	can	enact	change	 in	 the	world.	Hemmed	in	by	everyday	discourse	that	is	given	meaning	through	hegemonic	articulation,	we	need	an	 alternative	 way	 forward.	 And	 poetry	 and	 art	 can	 help	 to	 bring	 about	material	 change	 in	 the	world.	There	is	a	need	to	take	up	aesthetic	theory	and	the	project	that	embraces	the	transfiguring	potential	of	art:	“[t]he	highest	mission	of	art	is	to	metamorphose	the	real.	Practical	actions,	includ-ing	techniques,	modify	the	everyday;	the	artwork	transfigures	it”	(Lefebvre,1998,	p.	83).		But,	two	thoughts	now	arise.	One,	how	do	we	operationalize	acts	of	poetic	language	to	create	so-cial	change	or	revolution?	I	am,	to	put	it	mildly,	highly	skeptical	that	a	poem—or	even	a	whole	son-net—can	change	the	world.	And	two,	poetry	does	not	exist	outside	of	the	social.	To	think	otherwise	is	to	ignore	the	way	in	which	aesthetics	is	culturally	created,	that	the	poetry	that	is	published	in	a	book	or	posted	online	is	a	part	of	a	system	of	production,	or	that	poets	themselves	aren’t	cognitive	labourers.	To	 the	extent	 that	poetry	has	not	been	captured	by	capital—after	all,	while	poetry	 is	a	part	of	the	productive	process	it	is	hardly	the	work	of	the	ruling	class	(what	does	big	business	care	of	 poetry?)—it	 has	 been	 culturally	 distanced	 from	 the	 everyday;	 if	 poetry	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 being	‘outside,’	it	is	outside	of	the	everyday.	George	Thomson	(1946),	in	his	brief	work	Marxism	and	Poet-








culture	erased	by	a	“social	imperialism”	whereby	culture	became	a	tool	of	capital,	a	form	of	cultural	production	and	re-production	(Hall,	1998,	p.	444-446).	In	the	end,	Hall	(1998)	developed	a	concep-tion	of	popular	 culture	polarized	around	a	 cultural	dialectic	 in	which	 there	 is	an	ongoing	 tension	and	process	of	becoming;	all	cultural	forms	are	contradictory,	composed	of	antagonistic	and	unsta-ble	elements.	In	such	a	view,	popular	culture	should	not	be	dismissed	nor	ceded	unnecessarily	(e.g.	the	Frankfurt	School);	rather,	we	need	to	see	 it	as	a	place	“where	socialism	might	be	constituted”	(Hall,	1998,	p.	453).	While	the	way	forward	-	towards	the	constitution	of	an	independent	public	and	popular	culture	-	remains	unclear,	 it	 is	possible	 to	point	 certain	 axes	 that	may	be	mobilized	 in	 such	a	project.	The	technologies	of	mass	society	and	of	the	culture	industry	that	had	emerged	by	the	mid-20th	century	do	today	offer	a	particular	rationale	that	has	helped	to	shape	our	cultural	horizon—a	horizon	dom-inated	by	the	culture	industry.	However,	this	outcome	was	not	necessarily	determined.	Technology	is	something	that	is	contested	(Feenberg	and	Bakardjieva	2004).		Despite	the	degree	to	which	the	emancipatory	potential	of	old	communication	technologies	has	been	 foreclosed	upon,	 it	does	not	necessarily	 follow	 that	new	media	 technologies	will	 follow	 this	same	route.	While	the	rationale	that	these	new	technologies	help	to	establish	is	partially	a	function	of	 the	structuring	of	 the	economic	system,	 they	also	help	 to	disrupt	sites	of	authority	and	help	 to	create	new	centres	of	power.	Hope	yet	remains.		There	are	a	number	of	studies	(e.g.	Simco,	2012)	that	have	compared	online	popular	culture	to	a	Bakhtinian	Carnivalesque	and	this	can	provide	an	entry	point	 into	reinvigorating	a	cultural	Marx-ism	 that	 has	 been	 lacking	 from	 the	 works	 of	 many	 political	 economy	 communication	 scholars.	While	this	approach	does	have	its	strengths,	I	am	loathing	to	rely	too	heavily	on	this	theoretical	lens	for	three	reasons.	One,	the	Carnivalesque	is	a	largely	utopian	view	of	folk	culture	and	while	the	uto-pian	is	invigorating,	it	also	means	the	concept	has	limited	applicability	as	a	semiotic	strategy.	Two,	by	its	very	nature,	the	Carnivalesque	remains	outside	of	the	everyday.	It	is	something	that	exists	as	a	state	of	exception	to	the	social	order.	As	a	state	of	exception,	it	does	provide	a	critical	distance	and	an	enormous	space	within	which	the	status	quo	can	be	ridiculed	and	critiqued.	However,	this	dis-tance,	as	being	outside	of	 the	everyday,	 limits	 its	ability	 to	 influence	our	subjectivity.	And	three,	 I	am	uncertain	that	the	idea	of	the	Carnivalesque	gives	us	the	intellectual	space	to	adequately	call	out	the	 serious	problems	with	our	everyday	online	popular	 culture.	And	 there	 is	 a	 lot	wrong	with	 it:	from	 the	 homophobia	 present	 in	 the	 everyday	 language	 of	 4chan;	 to	 the	misogyny	 of	 redditors,	men’s	 rights	 activists,	 or	 forums	devoted	 to	pick-up	artists;	 and	 the	 racism	of	 lolCat	 speak.	At	 its	best,	the	idea	of	online	popular	culture	as	having	carnivalesque	spaces	and	elements	provides	a	way	to	 re-conceptualize	 banal	 and	 grotesque	 online	 behaviour	 as	 turning	 established	 conventions	 on	their	head.	However,	at	its	worst—in	the	way	in	which	its	traditionalism	reinforces	misogyny,	rac-ism,	and	homophobia—I	am	uncertain	to	the	extent	to	which	it	offers	the	potential	for	a	revolution-ary	moment	as	opposed	to	an	act	of	catharsis	or	strengthening	of	the	status	quo.							It	is	more	toward	Stuart	Hall,	and	his	notion	of	popular	culture	as	being	polarized	around	a	cul-tural	dialectic,	 that	we	must	 turn.	The	contradictory,	antagonistic,	and	unstable	nature	of	popular	culture	creates	opportunity	and	space	for	new	forms	of	political	participation—while	also	allowing	us	 to	 be	 critical	 and	 to	 check	 our	 privilege.	 This	 is	 not	 the	political	 participation	derided	by	 Jodi	Dean,	but	rather	the	participation-through-other-means	hinted	at	by	Darin	Barney	in	Excuse	us	if	we	




In	particular,	our	semiotic	strategy	must	be	one	of	“making	strange”.	Fred	Wah	(2000),	drawing	on	the	work	of	Viktor	Shlovsky,	introduced	this	term	as	he	worked	through	his	own	experiences	as	a	poet,	academic,	and	activist:			“The	technique	of	art	is	to	make	objects	 ‘unfamiliar,’	to	make	forms	difficult,	to	increase	the	difficulty	and	length	of	perception	because	the	process	of	perception	is	an	aesthetic	end	in	it-self	and	must	be	prolonged.	Art	is	a	way	of	experiencing	the	artfulness	of	an	object;	the	object	is	not	important.”		Poetry,	by	making	objects	unfamiliar—making	strange—helps	 to	reinvent	and	renew	our	percep-tions	of	both	the	objects	and	our	social	reality	that	otherwise	might	be	reified.	The	 idea	of	making	strange	 is	very	similar	 to	Paul	Ricoeur’s	 (1975/77)	characterization	of	 the	function	of	a	metaphor	as	a	discursive	categorical	transgression.	It	is	a	calculated	error	which	“dis-turb[s]	a	whole	network	by	means	of	an	aberrant	attribution”;	it	is	a	way	to	“rediscover	reality”	(pp.	21-22).	It	is	my	belief	that	we	have	not	lost	our	sense	of	poetry,	but	rather	it	has	been	taken	from	us	and	misinterpreted,	 thus	 losing	 its	power	and	appeal	 (Thomson,	1946).	Online	popular	culture	 is	our	way	 of	 reclaiming	 the	 poetic	 and	 in	 the	 process	 re-imagining	 participation	 and	hopefully	 re-opening	our	discursive	imagination.	In	essence,	we	are	given	free	rein	to	make	strange.		Poetry	 in	an	age	of	communicative	capitalism	unites	pictures,	words,	video	and	music;	 it	 is	ar-gumentative,	 antagonistic,	 funny,	 contemplative	and	down-right	 confusing;	 it	 stretches	and	alters	communication	and	the	socio-ideological	by	 taking	an	enclosed	and	co-opted	popular	culture	and	“making	strange”.	Whether	it	is	“I	can	have	Cheeseburger	Cat”	espousing	Marxist	ideas,	to	the	“sav-ing	room	for	cats”	Tumblr,	to	humorous,	but	pointed	takes	on	the	ways	in	which	men	feel	entitled	to	space	on	public	 transit,	or	 the	online	response	to	men	that	say	“not	ALL	men”	are	misogynists	or	rape—the	poetry	within	the	everyday	is	being	reinvigorated	by	online	popular	culture.	This	is	but	a	barest	glimpse	of	a	theoretical	start	in	devising	a	cultural	studies	approach	to	semi-otic	strategies	within	cognitive	capitalism.	But	echoing	Hall	(1998),	it	is	the	extent	to	which	popular	culture	and	technology	are	sites	of	contestation	and	the	degree	to	which	they	can	be	mobilized	to	destabilize	systems	of	domination	that	they	matter.	“Otherwise,	to	tell	you	the	truth,	I	don’t	give	a	damn	about	it”	(p.	453).		
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